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Schumpeter on money, banking and finance: 
















 In this paper, we provide an institutional interpretation of Schumpeter’s analysis of money, 
banking and finance. This interpretation is founded on an overall investigation into 
Schumpeter’s writings addressing those issues from different perspectives. 
In section 1, we discuss the widespread evolutionist interpretation of Schumpeter and 
rather assert an institutionalist perspective. In support of our interpretation, we highlight the 
specific role played by economic sociology in Schumpeter’s methodological approach. 
                                                 
* We thank the International Center for Economic Research (ICER – Turin) for its financial support. We 
acknowledge remarks by Pascal Bridel, Harald Hagemann and the two anonymous referees on earlier versions of 
this paper. The usual caveat applies.  
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Economic sociology, indeed, provides the foundations of a theory of institutions and 
institutional change, which is often undermined by the usual evolutionary interpretation. We 
believe, however, that taking this dimension seriously into account may have implications for 
our understanding of economic and institutional change in Schumpeter.  
Section 2 illustrates this general statement by focusing on Schumpeter’s analysis of money, 
banking and finance, and their respective roles in the process of economic development . 
Starting from the angle of the three pedagogical stages of Schumpeter’s analysis of economic 
development – the circular flow, the steady-state and the development cases – we show how 
institutional change is progressively introduced into those respective cases and emphasize the 
leading role of the banking system in the overall evolution of the financial system. Two 
functions of the banking system will be specifically pointed out. On the one hand, the banking 
system, through its function of credit creation, is seen as the ‘ephor’ of the capitalist system, 
as an institutional setting pre-existing to it and rendering its expansion possible. On the other 
hand, the banking system face inner tensions due to transformations taking place within the 
economic system and must adapt to those changes. In this perspective, the banking system 
may be conceived as a vector of innovation in the field of banking and corporate finance, 
which, similarly to the real sector, is ruled by the law of creative destruction. 
 
1. Schumpeter’s vision of economic development: an institutionalist perspective. 
 
Schumpeter’s work has been often taken as reference for most evolutionary economists 
(see for instance, the emblematic 1982 book of Nelson and Winter). In the following, we will 
however argue that Schumpeter’s hesitation to use the evolution metaphor is not incidental 
but gives us some indication of what he meant by economic evolution. For us, it is clear that 
Schumpeter’s vision of economic development, even if it may lend itself to some to-day 
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evolutionary explanations of economic change, cannot be understood without taking the 
complementary and necessary role of institutional changes seriously.  
 
1.1. Schumpeter and the evolution metaphor 
 
In Schumpeter’s writings, we find many arguments against the use of the evolution 
metaphor. At his epoch, this metaphor was invading many fields of social sciences and 
Schumpeter was very keen to warn the economists against the biological analogy which the 
term ‘evolution’ could imply2. As early as in Das Wesen…, Schumpeter refers to Marshall’s 
attempt at making use of such analogies, noting that this did not produce the result one could 
reasonably have anticipated but rather created “the danger of confusion” (Schumpeter 1908: 
538). 
In a 1917/1918 paper entitled ‘Money and the Social Product’, Schumpeter also makes 
little secret of his hostility against his contemporary Austrian masters, stating that their 
‘causal-genetic’ explanations provide striking examples of the danger of ‘evolutionary’ 
reasoning: “[T]he historical beginnings of a phenomenon by no means always show it in its 
simplest and purest form, so that an attempt to get at the essential nature of the problem by 
genetic treatment may be easily misleading.” (Schumpeter 1956 [1917/1918]: 157). 
 
Later, in a recently discovered article from 1932 entitled “Development”3, Schumpeter also 
makes it clear in a Max Weberian manner that he wanted to protect himself against an 
                                                 
2 This position comes out most clearly in the first German edition of his Theorie der wirstschaflichen 
Entwicklung (1911/12), which has recently been republished by Duncker&Humblot in Berlin. 
 
3 Schumpeter’s  article on “Development” was written by the author as a contribution to the Festschrift for Emil 
Lederer in 1932. It was translated by M. Becker and T. Knudsen in the Journal of Economic Literature in 2005 
(vol. 43:1, pp. 108-111; Introduction of this volume jointly written by M. Becker, H. Eßlinger, U. Hedtke and T. 
Knudsen). 
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unscientific connotation, this time, of the term Entwicklung (development), with value 
judgments of progress: 
“(…) [T]wo (…) associations (…) are responsible for the scientific discredit of the 
term ‘development’ (…). These two associations can be characterized by the terms 
‘faith in progress’ and ‘evolutionism’.” (Schumpeter 2005 [1932]: 119) 
 
 Referring to the Darwinian or Mendelian types of theory of descent, he notes, in the same 
article, that: 
 
“[i]t always fails when it comes to the inaccessibility and indeterminacy of novelty 
and of the leap, even more so when such a theory of descent acknowledges the 
leap and names it, e.g. sport or mutation. It always runs into logical limits, or in 
other words, the fact that our logic is a logic of the adaptation process which can 
only deny or dismiss development.” (Schumpeter 2005 [1932]: 118) 
 
In sum, for Schumpeter, social science, in general, and economic theory, in particular, must 
remain value-free. In passing, this feature constitutes a strong point of convergence between 
Schumpeter and Max Weber4. Moreover, a theory of development has to face the problem of 
novelty seriously,, which requires a logic which goes beyond the mere logic of adaptation 
displayed by Darwinian or Mendelian types of evolutionary theory. 
In his Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter indeed rejects the idea that the whole 
of mankind would show “some kind of uniform unlinear development”, as assumed by the 
German Historical School personified by Roscher as well as the evolutionary thought centred 
in Darwin, but also psychologist explanations which consist in “seeing more in motives and 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, W. Powell (1996). 
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acts of volition than a reflex of the social process” (Schumpeter 1934: 57). He adds, thus 
reinforcing his claim for value-free economic theory, that we must get away from 
evolutionary ideas that are surrounded by “the reproach of unscientific and extra-mysticism” 
as well as “of dilettantism” (ibid: 58). 
 
From what precedes, it is clear that Schumpeter is careful about the use of the evolutionary 
metaphor to depict the process of economic change.  
More precisely, it is not so much the terms ‘evolution’ or even ‘development’ that 
Schumpeter rejects but rather the tendency in the history of ideas to associate these terms with 
value judgements5. His dithering in time concerning the use of the English terms of 
‘evolution’ or ‘development’ shows his caution and the difficulty he finds to describe properly 
what he has in mind. Not incidently, in a letter to Stewart S. Morgan of May 18, 1934, two 
months after he wrote the preface to the Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter refers 
to his book as the Theory of Economic Evolution (see U. Hedtke and R. Swedberg 2000: 
267)6.  Besides, in his subsequent Business Cycles, and more precisely in chapter IV (“The 
Contours of Economic Evolution”) Schumpeter takes up the term ‘evolution’ as a key 
ingredient. 
Besides, Schumpeter raises an additional argument against evolutionary explanations of his 
time in the field of natural sciences: the fact that they are unable to deal in a satisfactory 
manner with the problem of novelty7. 
                                                 
5 See Schumpeter 1983 [1954], pp. 85–98. 
6 We are grateful to the referee for this indication.  
7 This issue is addressed by M. Becker, T. Knudsen and J. March (2006). They first note that Schumpeter’s 
opinion of Darwin’s evolutionary theory is not entirely clear, because it depends on an interpretation of the few 
remarks he made on the subject in his writings (Becker, Knudsen and March 2006: 356). In the above quoted 
passage from Development (2005 [1932]: 118), Schumpeter acknowledges the value of both Darwin’s and 
Mendel’s theories as explanations of incremental change but however dismiss both theories as explanations of 
novelty and discontinuity. To put the matter in a nutshell, Schumpeter “saw clearly that ‘mutation’, as that term 
is normally used in Darwinian evolutionary theories, is less an explanation than a label for the inexplicable.” 
(ibid: 357). Secondly, they rightly point out one of the major challenges of Schumpeter’s theoretical endeavour: 
to explain novelty as arising endogenously in a routine-based system. Among the various routes that Schumpeter 
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Now, regarding economic evolution, Schumpeter makes clear that this phenomenon 
involves the element of novelty or change as a crucial factor. In his own terms, “evolution is a 
disturbance of existing structures (…) more like a series of explosions than a gentle process, 
through incessant transformation” (Schumpeter 1939/ I: 102). Since development is defined 
as a change from one equilibrium (Schumpeter 1934, 1939) or ‘norm’ (Schumpeter 2005 
[1932]) to another in such a way that the process of change or transition involves 
discontinuity, its analysis requires, according to Schumpeter, a different logic from the one 
conveyed by the logic of adaptation or incremental change. Furthermore, as Schumpeter puts 
it, “development is a problem, not simply of the facts but of our  mental apparatus.” 
(Schumpeter 2005 [1932]: 117). 
To sum up and at first sight, Schumpeter’s conception of economic evolution, can hardly 
be reconciled with Darwinism, even though no Darwinism copyright can be imposed on the 
word ‘evolution’ (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006: 2). In some sense, some of Schumpeter’s 
objections to Darwinism are still topical. For instance, the idea that human intentionality is 
inconsistent with the ‘blind’ process of Darwinism is not so far from Schumpeter’s insistence 
on the fact that innovation is the result of the activity of “New Men” (Schumpeter 1939/I: 96) 
and not the result of mere adaptation from already existing production structures, following 
some kind of stochastic process8.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
identified in order to explain novelty (character traits of entrepreneurs, new combinations generated by 
production functions, interaction effects between different spheres of the social realm and inspiration from 
theories of evolution), no one proved to be entirely satisfactory. Related to the explanation based on new 
combinations, Becker, Knudsen and March notes that Schumpeter’s interest in Mendel and Mendel’s discoverer 
de Vries (as assessed by an interview with Wofgang Stolper, 4 August 2001, at his home in Ann Arbor, MI) 
“might indicate that he hoped for the identification of some regularity underlying replications, such as the 
Mendelian combinatorics of reproduction”, in order to provide a more precise inheritance mechanism than the 
word ‘combination’ (ibid: 357).  
8 In this respect, Winter’s argument is not that far from Schumpeter’s, insofar as he also rejects, in a Penrosian 
way, the use of biological analogies in economics. He however is more optimistic about the possibility of 
replacing “the idea that mutations are inexplicable or random events”, with “ideas that associate mutations, for 
the most part, with intentional, motivated change.” (Becker, Knudsen and March 2006: 359).  
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The aforementioned remarks concerning Schumpeter’s attitude towards evolutionism do 
not however entirely preclude an evolutionary type of interpretation of Schumpeter’s analysis 
of economic change. Given the great variety of evolutionary explanations of economic change 
and the lack of clarity of the present ‘evolutionary economics’ project, we will not explain in 
detail why and how those explanations could be reconciled with Schumpeter’s original 
message. To put the matter in a nutshell, we agree with Hodgson and Knudsen that any 
evolutionary economic explanation involves some Darwinian principles, such as the 
principles of selection, variation and inheritance as basic ontological features. However, this 
does not mean that a generalized Darwinism is enough to explain the processes of social 
evolution. In sum, it provides more a “meta-theoretical framework than a complete theory” 
(Hodgson and Knudsen 2006: 17). From this very restricted viewpoint, Schumpeter’s analysis 
may be considered as ‘evolutionary’. However, we argue that this interpretation is, to say the 
least, incomplete, or even misleading, if we take into account Schumpeter’s methodological 
specificity, and in particular, the importance he attaches to economic sociology9 .  
 
1.2. Schumpeter’s conception of economic sociology: the role of institutional factors 
 
As well-known, Schumpeter’s method is clearly defined in Chapter 2 of his History of 
Economic Analysis (1954), where he distinguishes the three ‘techniques’ – history, statistics 
and (economic) theory -  that together constitute ‘economic analysis’. In addition to these 
three techniques, there is economic sociology which constitutes a fully-fledged component of 
his methodology. The arguments in support of Schumpeter’s claim for the introduction of a 
supplementary technique in the toolbox of economists may be summarized as follows. 
                                                 
9 For an assessment of the importance of economic sociology in Schumpeter’s work, see Shionoya (1997), 
Swedberg (1989, 1991). 
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The reasons why economic sociology should constitute a fully-fledged field of economic 
analysis and be dealt with separately from economic history or economic theory are outlined 
by Schumpeter.  
On the one hand, he argues that the institution of property and freedom of contract or the 
introduction of any kind of government regulation are not only a concern of economic history 
but they constitute social facts that shape the society and thus make economic history a kind 
of generality, a type or a model. From this perspective, economic sociology can be described, 
in accordance to Schmoller’s definition as a ‘theory of generalizing history’. In a paper he 
dedicated to Schmoller, Schumpeter notes  that “economic theory usually contains statements 
about ‘social institutions’, such as ‘property’, ‘inheritance’ and ‘the family’, and that theses 
institutions are ‘partly economic’ and ‘partly non economic in nature’. Social institutions 
therefore cannot be analysed with conventional economic theory; pure economic theory is 
only applicable to topics such as value, price, and money. Something else is needed – a 
‘theory of economic institutions, basically within economic theory’. And this something else 
is economic sociology” (Schumpeter 1926, quoted by Swedberg 1991: 46). As Shionoya puts 
it nicely: economic sociology is therefore conceived by Schumpeter as a “bridge between 
history and theory” or as a “compromise between the generality meant by theory and the 
individuality meant by history” (Shionoya 1997: 200). This methodological feature however 
needs further clarification in order to give full support to our institutionalist interpretation. In 
particular, economic sociology is not conceived by Schumpeter as comprehensive method for 
analysing the process of sociocultural development, but rather consists in an approximation 
insofar as it summarizes the set of interactions that occurs at different levels of social life in 
order to focus on the institutional factors that are closely linked with economic activity.  In 
other terms, Schumpeter explicitly restricts the scope of economic sociology to the study of 
institutions (Swedberg 1989). 
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On the other hand, Schumpeter emphasizes the fact that economic sociology provides a theory 
of economic behavior conceived as embedded and interacting with the institutional setting of 
the whole society and not assumed as a given datum inherited from history. The following 
quotation taken from Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis, reinforces the argument by 
locating the demarcation line between theory and economic sociology precisely at the level of 
the assumptions concerning behavior: 
 
“ (…) economic analysis deals with the questions how people behave at any time 
and what the economic effects are they produce by so behaving; economic 
sociology deals with the question how they came to behave as they do. If we 
define human behaviour widely enough so that it includes not only actions and 
motives and propensities but also the social institutions that are relevant to 
economic behaviour such as government, property inheritance, contract, and so on, 
that phrase really tells us what we need. ” (Schumpeter 1954: 47–8, underlined by 
us) 
 
Therefore, economic sociology is valuable and deserves special focus because it permits to 
deal with the institutional background underlying economic behavior. Moreover, it allows to 
endogenize economic behaviour, which is usually taken as an exogenous factor by economic 
analysis. Such a procedure also permits to derive heterogenous norms of behaviour, in 
contrast to the uniform and universal norm of behaviour, i.e. the hedonistic (and static) norm 
of behaviour taken as granted by Walrasian economic analysis10.  
                                                 
10 This argument can also be extended in order to deal with Schumpeter’s conception of rationality. Taking into 
account economic sociology indeed permits a better understanding of Schumpeter’s multi-level methodological 
perspective (see the distinction ‘rationality of the observer’ vs. ‘rationality of the observed’ in Schumpeter 1940) 
concerning the problem of  rationality in economics. More generally, the introduction of economic sociology 
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Finally, and more generally, economic sociology can be interpreted as one bridge between 
statics and dynamics, or as means to unify Schumpeter’s analytical framework, by qualifying 
the usual argument of the logical inconsistency between the routine-based static circular flow 
and the case of development, supposedly arising endogenously from the circular flow11. If 
economic sociology or, in other words, the analysis of the role of institutions and institutional 
change, can be considered as secondary for economists whose interest is focused on the 
working of stationary economic states, it becomes however a central issue for dealing with 
economic dynamics, as Schumpeter defines it, i.e., “such changes in economic life as are not 
forced upon it from without but arise by its own initiative, from within.” (Schumpeter 1934: 
63). Under those circumstances, economic sociology cannot be considered as non economical, 
and thus must also to be distinguished from simple sociology. Moreover, since Schumpeter 
excludes from the definition of economic development such changes in data or in economic 
conditions, to which the economy continuously adapts (ibid), economic sociology provides 
the tool for dealing with the social structure of an economic system. More precisely, for 
Schumpeter, economic sociology or social institutions are more than a complement to 
economic analysis. They rather constitute a logical priority to it. In other terms, for 
Schumpeter, it is not possible to deal with economic change without considering 
complementary and necessary previous institutional change. This is rather well expressed in 
the following passage: 
 
“Because of the fundamental dependence of the economic aspect of things on 
everything else, it is not possible to explain economic change by previous 
                                                                                                                                                        
into Schumpeter’s methodological framework permits to extend the range of application of rational models as 
compared to pure economic theory (see Festré and Garrouste 2006).   
11 We have in mind, here, for instance, the role of leadership and the character traits of the entrepreneur in 
Schumpeter’s first German edition of the Theory of Economic Development. For a more detailed discussion of 
Schumpeter’s shifts of emphasis, from the second edition onward, from the individual entrepreneur conceived as 
a leader interacting with many various sectors of social life (economics, politics, art, etc.) to the de-personified 
entrepreneurial function, see Becker and Knudsen 2002.  
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economic conditions alone. For the economic state of a people does not emerge 
simply from the preceding economic conditions, but only from the preceding total 
situation” (Schumpeter 1934: 58, underlined in the original) 
 
In sum, economic sociology deals with the institutional background underlying economic 
behaviour but also with how this background is likely to change, i.e., institutional change.   
In an article entitled “American Institutions and Economic Progress”12, Schumpeter 
clarifies his conception of institutions and institutional change. He emphasizes that, “by 
‘institutions’ we mean in this course all the patterns of behaviour into which individuals must 
fit under penalty of encountering organized resistance, and not only legal institutions (such as 
property or the contract) and the agencies for their production or enforcement” (Schumpeter 
1950a in Swedberg 1991, p. 438). This definition is perfectly consistent with the subject-
matter of economic sociology, which consists, as we have emphasized, in relating institutions 
to economic behaviour. A few lines later, Schumpeter adds that , “institutional patterns (…) 
shape the economic process” and [that] the analysis of the sequence of events of this process 
cannot be adequately explained either by economics or by political science. (ibid: 440) but 
requires a specific analysis of institutional change. In the same article, Schumpeter sketches 
out a picture of what this analysis could be by mentioning several factors of institutional 
change.  
A first factor of institutional change is related to routine activity, which “induces in itself a 
slow process of institutional change which it is very important to understand” (ibid. p. 439). 
The usual interpretation of Schumpeter’s conception of routines often opposes routines to 
innovation within the productive sphere, but undermines the fact that Schumpeter also makes 
                                                 
12 This text constitutes the basis for a series of lectures that Schumpeter was scheduled to give during January 
1950 at the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation in Chicago. The day before the first lecture, however, Schumpeter 
died. The text first appeared in 1983 in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft. It has been reprinted by R. 
Swedberg (1991). 
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clear that  routines are part of the underlying institutional setting “which compel individuals 
and groups to behave in certain ways whatever they may wish to do – not indeed by 
destroying their freedom of choice but by shaping the choosing mentalities and by narrowing 
the list of possibilities from which to choose” (Schumpeter 1950: 129-30). From this 
perspective, economic change is also concerned with how routines change.  
This quotation stresses the fact that routines are embedded within the society as a whole and 
illustrates the importance of how institutional change is important in order to deal with 
economic change. In the remaining of the paper, we will show how banking and financial 
institutions are likely to establish routines in the everyday banking practices and how 
economic and institutional change may alter those routines and their associated anchored 
behaviours, so as to permit economic development.  
 
A second factor, which Schumpeter refers as the ‘personal element’ of institutional change, is 
brought about by the responses of social groups of individuals to the impact of factors 
external to the given institutional pattern of a given society. This factor clearly relates to the 
phenomenon of leadership, which is at the core of Schumpeter’s theory of social classes 13, 
but also refers to a specific non-routinized kind of behaviour. In the following, we will 
emphasize the role of the personal equation as a factor of change by arguing 1) that creative 
destruction occurs not only in the production sphere, as well-known, but also within the 
                                                 
13 As suggested by Shionoya, “the structure of Schumpeter’s theory of social classes” can be summarized as 
follows: 
“It starts from the general theory of leadership, it defines various social areas as the fields in which social 
functions are fulfilled, it arranges the complex of social areas in terms of social values or social leadership 
(the aptitude of fulfilling the social functions) to derive a social hierarchy (social classes), and it summarizes 
in the word Zeitgeist the spiritual and cultural expressions that correspond to the hierarchical social classes 
thus derived.” (Shionoya 1997: 250) 
 
Schumpeter’s conception on social classes is found in his 1927 article on Social classes, where he makes clear 
that individuals’ behaviour are not to be considered as strictly individual but also as the result of social 
stratification. This feature is symptomatic of Schumpeter’s methodological approach, which consists in a mix of 
methodological individualism and holism. In passing, Schumpeter breaks off in this regard with most of his 
Austrian contemporaries. For more details on Schumpeter’s conception of social classes and how it is compatible 
with methodological individualism, see Arena and Festré (2006: 54-55) and Festré and Garrouste (2006).  
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financial sphere, and 2) that this process is triggered by individuals such as bankers or groups 
of individuals such as partnerships between financiers and manufacturers, who display a 
different norm of behaviour than the one associated with previously established financial 
practices.   
A third factor constitutes what Schumpeter refers as the ‘element of chance’ of institutional 
change, i.e., the possibility that “situations may arise in business or in politics the temporal 
coincidence of which, though some extent fortuitous, may produce consequences that could 
not have been predicted from any study of either development taken separately.”  
“(Schumpeter 1950a in Swedberg 1991, p. 441)14.  This factor may be interpreted as follows:  
for Schumpeter, the capitalist economy is a turbulent system, constantly in motion, but to 
think more precisely about what factors are unique and which are repeated, or what is random 
and what is determinate, requires close attention to institutional and historical detail. 
However, Schumpeter did not believe the task of explaining change in the economy should be 
turned over to the economic historians or the economic sociologist; the goal of economic 
theory should be to account for change. This third factor therefore accounts for the 
indeterminateness that is irreducible in any theoretical endeavour to analyze economic 
change. This factor may, for instance, refer to financial or monetary international crises, the 
consequence of which could alter the working of financial institutions in a radical and 
irreversible way.  
With these three factors we can now draw some provisional properties of institutional 
change for Schumpeter. 
First, institutional change is conceived as an endogenous process. This feature is often 
overlooked by the usual interpretation of Schumpeter’s analysis, which claims that 
                                                 
14 Schumpeter mentions a fourth factor of institutional change, which is “brought about by the responses of 
politicians, bureaucrats and journalists to the impact of factors external [such as wars or crises] to the given 
institutional pattern of a given society.  
. 
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Schumpeter is focused on the emergent properties of change, while neglecting the process of 
change itself15. Our interpretation is however based on the role of economic sociology, i.e., on 
the institutional background underlying economic behaviour. As can be briefly summarized, 
this institutional background contains several analytical ingredients such as social 
stratification (involving both an interclass and intraclass dynamics in relation to some 
necessary social functions) or the phenomenon of leadership (also involving an individual and 
a social dimension). To put the matter in a nutshell, the institutional setting of the society is 
crucial for understanding economic change given that it moulds the behaviour of individuals 
and vice versa since repeated behaviours become anchored into the institutional setting to 
such an extent that they constitute routines that strengthen the institutional background. 
Second, institutional change is a process involving the interaction of distinct groups of men 
such as families or social classes that are defined according to the social function they have to 
perform in a given society. The existence of such groups, which have some degree of 
autonomy vis-à-vis individuals and interact with each other in many instances of social life, 
may give rise to social values or collective beliefs that mould the public opinion and shape the 
behaviours of individuals. This feature is at the basis of the phenomenon of leadership. 
Third, institutional change is a process that involves gradual, sequential, and incremental 
transformations due to the relative autonomy and inertia of collective beliefs or to leadership 
that may involve self-inforcement mechanisms (success bringing success…). Moreover, 
patterns of individual behaviours adapt only slowly and gradually to the changing 
environment because ‘routinized’ or automatic behaviour implies some resistance to change. 
Fourth, institutional change is also characterized by a process of ‘destructive creation’ and 
therefore, of radical change16. Within this process, the ‘personal equation’ or the ‘personal 
                                                 
15 See for instance, F. Perroux in his Introduction to French translation of Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic 
Development, Paris: Dalloz, 1935. 
16 From an analytical perspective, the dichotomy between radical and incremental changes refers to the 
opposition between punctuated equilibrium vs. gradualism (see N. Eldredge and S.J. Gould 1972)  
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element’ plays a crucial role since it permits, under some favourable circumstances, to break 
off with established routines and brings in some novelty into the system, sometimes under the 
impulse of major crises or conflicts of interests. On the other hand, social groups are likely to 
disappear if they prove not able to perform their social functions under the renewed 
institutional setting.  
Finally, the evolution of society is ultimately for its most part driven by economic forces 
because of the “fundamental dependence of the economic aspect of things on everything else” 
(Schumpeter 1934: 58). However, this process is not deterministic since economic 
transformations such as new combinations for instance are retained by the social structure, the 
underlying mechanism being the interaction among agents, and social agents nested within 
social sectors. Social stratification then reflects on the behaviour of individuals so that there 
appear dynamic mechanisms such as self-enforcement but also hysteresis or inertia effects 
that imply that in most of the cases, the evolution of institutions and social structures, lags 
behind the process of economic change17.  
This way of looking at institutional change is not far from North’s idea that crises are 
important as a matter that strengthens new ideas and weakens the position of the status quo 
tenants (North 1994). It also bears a relation to Hodgson’s conception of institutions as both 
subjective ideas in the heads of individuals and objective structures faced by them: “agents 
and structures, though distinct, are connected through a circle of mutual interactions and 
interdependence.” (Hodgson 1998: 181).  
 
Let us now investigate how this overall framework of institutional change may be dealt 
with in the specific case of Schumpeter’s analysis of money, banking and finance.  
 
                                                 
17 For more details, see Festré and Garrouste (2006). 
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2. Banking institutions and economic development 
 
The great diffusion of Schumpeter’s contribution on innovation casts his banking and 
credit analysis into the shadows. This section aims at showing however that in Schumpeter’s 
theory, each stage of capitalist development is shaped by the institutional structure, especially 
banking institutions and that this structure is always evolving in response to profit-seeking 
activity under the constantly renewed financial institutional setting. 
 
2.1. The banker, as the “ephor” of the capitalist system 
 
Before entering into a precise analysis of the role of monetary and financial institutions in 
Schumpeter’s description of the process of economic development, a few introductory 
remarks may be fruitful. First, we want to emphasize that Schumpeter’s contribution in the 
monetary field cannot be understand in isolation from the other parts of his vision of 
economic development. 
In particular, four aspects of Schumpeter’s monetary analysis are worth reminding. 
First, it should be stressed that, building on the Quesnay-Walras concept of ‘circular flow’, 
Schumpeter conceives economic life as “a system of flows of monetary expenditure directed 
toward objects sold against such expenditure” (Marget 1951 [1991], p. 180). 
Second, given that monetary analysis is defined by Schumpeter as “a theory of the economic 
process in terms of expenditure flows”, money, is, in short, “the means whereby a link is 
established in time between the successive discretely realized events of the economic process” 
(ibid: 181). 
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Third, money in itself “has no organ of locomotion” but flows “in response to decisions 
made by economic units”, such as a consumer, a business firm, a government or a financial 
institution. With respect to decisions made by government and financial institutions, one 
should note that they determine “whether there shall be additions to, or subtractions from, the 
total stock of money-spending power, and what particular elements in the community shall 
receive or be deprived of money-spending power as a result of these decisions” (ibid: 181–
82). 
Fourth, this representation of the ‘circular flow’ of economic life rests “upon specific 
assumptions so as to the nature of the institutional arrangements which condition the 
functioning of the economic process” (ibid: 184).  In other word, for Schumpeter, “[i]t is the 
responsibility of monetary analysis in particular to see to it that the nature and functioning of 
monetary [and financial] institutions (…) be studied from the standpoint of their effect upon 
the magnitude and direction of money flows” (ibid: 184). 
It is in particular this last point that will be dealt within this section. We will show, using the 
tools of analysis of Schumpeter provided by the distinction between three successive cases – 
the ‘circular flow’, the ‘steady-growth case’ and the ‘development case’ – how monetary and 
financial institutions gradually and indirectly shape individuals’ behaviour as well as their 
position within social stratification, and consequently provide necessary conditions for 
economic (as well as institutional) change to occur.  
 
To begin, let us consider the case of the circular flow.  
At this stage, no specific monetary or financial institution is apparently involved. But, in the 
background of this theoretical scheme there exists an “institutional framework derived from 
economic history” (Schumpeter 1954: 16), namely, the fact that money in itself is a ‘social 
institution’ or a social accounting and clearing system (Schumpeter 1970, p. 206; Schumpeter 
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1956 [1917/1918]: 150)18. This provides a good example of what Schumpeter has in mind 
when in History of Economic Analysis, he advocates for the addition of a fourth technique of 
economic analysis, i.e., economic sociology, to the ones of history, statistics and ‘theory’, 
defining it as “a sort of generalized or typified or stylized economic history” or as the 
discipline that deals with the question of how social institutions come to operate as they do 
(Schumpeter 1954: 20–1).  
The function of money at this stage is however in principle “of a mere technical nature” with 
no effect on the distribution of income and the production structures: “money is essentially a 
device for carrying on business transactions, a mere satellite of commodities, a servant of the 
processes in the world of goods” (Schumpeter 1917/1918, p. 151).  
In other terms, within the setting of the circular flow, money is only considered as the mere 
counterpart of real exchanges.  
Schumpeter thus conceived of the circular flow as a case of simple reproduction, referring 
explicitly to Marx, or the fictitious basic skeleton of the process of development (Schumpeter 
1939/I) whereby there is no savings, no interest and no growth. The time interval considered 
is equal to the period of production, during which the social product, the sum of goods and 
services for consumption, is produced and consumed. All means of production last one 
period. Both types of goods result from the “productive services” of labour and “nature” 
(Schumpeter 1970: 113). Money is therefore viewed, in the spirit of Bendixen’s “claim 
theory” or “entrance ticket theory”, as “a claim ticket and a receipt voucher” of already 
existing goods and services (Schumpeter 1917/1918 [1954]: 154–55 and p. 160). 
 
                                                 
18 For more details, see C. Dangel-Hagnauer (2002), in R. Arena and C. Dangel-Hagnauer (eds), 2002. 
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Let us now consider the case of steady-growth. This stage is introduced by Schumpeter in 
order to deal with the appearance of savings into the economic process. It is worth quoting at 
length how Schumpeter defines this state: 
 
We will envisage a society, stationary in every respect, except in that it 
displays a positive rate of saving. Production functions are invariant 
and external disturbances are absent. There is a positive rate of interest. 
If, however, the system is adapted to the actual rate of savings (...) this 
disturbance will be currently absorbed; for, as long as saving goes on 
at all, each installment will depress the rate of interest to the extent 
required to create its own investment opportunity (...) The result 
would, in fact, be a steady growth of the system’s industrial outfit by 
the steady addition to it of new units of plants and machinery, which, 
however, must be of the same types as those which are already in use 
(…), in order to exclude a new and different element which would 
otherwise intrude.” (Schumpeter 1939/I: 79-80)  
 
The kind of savings Schumpeter refers to in this state is business saving, which is done 
with a specific investment purpose in mind. In other terms, there are no other motives for the 
act of savings than the motive of investing in the already existing technology, i.e., 
replacement for used physical capital, or addition to the existing capital stock19. 
Consequently, most sources of savings that are not regarded as claims to already existing 
income are absent from this ‘stationary state’. For instance, cash holdings or reserves20 are 
                                                 
19 See Festré (2002b), in R. Arena and C. Dangel-Hagnauer (eds), 2002. 
20 Cash holdings do not, in fact, belong to the ‘business sphere’ (Schumpeter, 1939/I: 124) but to the ‘sphere of 
hoard and reserves’ which, together with the ‘sphere of capital’, constitutes the ‘money market’, as already 
mentioned. See also R. Arena and A. Festré (1996), in L. Moss (ed), 1996: 167–77. 
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absent from this state. This also means that Schumpeter’s definition of saving excludes all 
considerations related to the Keynesian notion of liquidity21.  
Even though unusual, it is not surprising that Schumpeter includes the case of steady growth 
under ‘statics’. He simply regards it as an extension of the pure model of the ‘circular flow’ 
except, that it displays a positive rate of saving. One may possibly consider that Schumpeter’s 
ultimate purpose in introducing this intermediary case into the analysis is to create an organic 
link between the ‘circular flow’ and the case of ‘economic development’. 
Associated with the appearance of savings is the emergence of the phenomenon of interest. 
Given Schumpeter’s conception of saving22, interest23 can only be conceived as a purely 
“monetary phenomenon” (Schumpeter 1939/I: 128). Moreover, as the rate of interest is 
derived from the positive rate of profit associated with the operation of innovative productive 
activities, it is also a short-term phenomenon (see Arena and Festré 1996: 175).  
 
The steady-state case now authorizes the emergence of banks or other financial 
intermediaries, such as private capitalists for instance, which lend money or capital to 
producers in order for them to invest in capital goods and sustain a steady growth in the total 
industrial outfit. In this case, a strict equality between investment flows and savings in term of 
monetary flows is guaranteed and no structural change within the distribution of income or 
within the production system is allowed. 
Banks thus play a passive role, allowing credit that can only consist in already existing idle 
stocks of money that are claims to already existing income. In other terms, they do not disturb 
                                                 
21 For a comparison between Keynes and Schumpeter’s conception of savings, see Nasica in R. Arena and C. 
Hagnauer (2002) 
22 Schumpeter defines savings as “the earmarking, by an household, of an element of its current receipts –as 
distinguished from ‘capital gains’– for the acquisition of titles to income or for the payment of debt.” 
(Schumpeter, 1939/I, p. 75). “ 
23 Schumpeter defines interest as “the price paid by borrowers for a social permit to acquire commodities and 
services without having previously fulfilled the condition which in the institutional pattern of capitalism is 
normally set on the issue of such a social permit, i.e., without having previously contributed other commodities 
and services to the social stream.” (Schumpeter 1939/I: 123) 
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the normal operation of the existing production structures and the normal circulation of 
national income. This kind of credit corresponds to what Schumpeter refers as ‘normal credit’, 
i.e., credit that “creates claims to the social dividend, which represent and may be thought of 
as certifying services rendered and previous delivery of existing goods” (Schumpeter 1934: 
101). It is to be distinguished from the ‘abnormal credit’, which will appear in the 
development case. 
 
Let us now switch to the case of development. This case provides the core of Schumpeter’s 
contribution in his Theory of Economic Development as well as in Business Cycles. Now, the 
figures of the entrepreneur and the banker are consubstantial with the process of development. 
In the scheme of economic development, credit consists in the ‘abnormal’ kind of credit, i.e., 
credit that “creates claims to the social product, which, (…) in the absence of past productive 
services [can] only be described as certificates of future services or of goods yet to be 
produced” (Schumpeter 1934: 101). 
This implies that banks cannot be described as passive intermediaries as in the case of steady-
growth since they now play a key role in the distribution of economic resources. As 
Schumpeter puts it, the banker “has either replaced private capitalists or become their agent; 
he has himself become the capitalist par excellence. He stands between those who wish to 
form new combinations and the possessors of productive means.” (Schumpeter  1934: 74). 
 
On one side, banks interfere with real propagation mechanisms by allowing the transfer of 
productive resources to new entrepreneurs. These reallocation effects can interfere with price 
competition and alter the outcome of the process of adaptation in the course of which some 
existent firms turn out to have become unprofitable and are eliminated, while others, seizing 
new profit opportunities and being backed up by banks, manage to escape bankruptcy. This 
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feature is of utmost importance. In particular, it reveals the complementary nature of 
institutional and economic change, namely, the fact that institutions are the expression of the 
dominant position of leaders in society. In this way, the development of credit shows the 
leadership of entrepreneurs in the capitalist society, to such an extent that Schumpeter refers 
to credit as a special social permit which is given by the society to the entrepreneurs in order 
for them to have purchasing power at their disposal, without having to go through the usual 
path of labour (Schumpeter 1934: 107)  
 
On the other side, banks interact with entrepreneurs in determining the volume of credit. 
While it is the entrepreneurs who initiate the process, banks decide which of these initiatives 
to finance based on their expectations regarding the profitability of innovative projects and the 
entrepreneurs’ ability to repay their loans: “We know already by what forces this supply is 
regulated: first with regard to possible failures by entrepreneurs, and secondly with regard to 
the possible depreciation of the credit means of payment” (Schumpeter 1934: 195). In another 
passage, Schumpeter explicitly argues that “the banker must not only know what the 
transaction in which he is asked to finance and how it is likely to turn out, but he must also 
know the customer, his business, and even his private habits, and get, by frequently ‘talking 
things over him’, a clear picture of the situation.” (Schumpeter 1939/I: 116-17)   
 
On closer examination24, it is possible to define the equilibrium level of the interest rate at 
a given point in time by deriving a supply and a demand curve for credit.25 However, this 
description of the workings of the money market is not very satisfactory.  
                                                 
24 The rationale for this analytical development can be found in Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development. 
See Schumpeter 1934: 191-198. 
25 See Bellofiore 1991: 378, Messori 2004 and Festré (2002a). 
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In the first place, banks select entrepreneurs not only by setting the rate of interest but also 
by evaluating innovations as well as the entrepreneurs themselves and the subsequent use they 
make of a loan.  
Secondly, the changes in the demand for finance occurring throughout the cycle affect not 
only actual but also potential credit (i.e. the maximum credit banks can create in a given 
institutional context). Moreover, the question of technical limits to credit supply, such as may 
arise in a monetary system when banking operations are constrained by reserve requirements 
and when there is a preference for cash on the part of the public, is of little relevance to 
Schumpeter, given that banks can ration credit and manage cash/deposit ratios in a procyclical 
manner, reducing them in prosperity and raising them in a depression (Schumpeter 1934: 
112–15; Schumpeter 1939: 121–23; Schumpeter 1956 [1917/1918]: 206–8. In short, the actual 
supply of credit shifts with the demand and does not face a definite ceiling of potential credit 
supply since the latter moves procyclically.  
More importantly, the influence they exert on the financial side of the economy is not 
limited to credit creation and control. More specifically, in Schumpeter’s analysis banks are 
seen to have both a permanent and an asymmetric impact on the money market which 
includes both the ‘sphere of hoards and reserves’ and the ‘sphere of capital’. The common 
feature of these two spheres, and therefore the distinctive feature of the money market, is that 
they permit stock markets to work. The money market is the place where ‘cash reserves’, i.e. 
‘idle non circulating money’, and ‘income yielding assets’ are mutually exchanged 
(Schumpeter 1956 [1917/1918]: 176). The first sphere of the money market is the ‘sphere of 
hoards and reserves’. The second corresponds to ‘capital’ or ‘income-yielding assets’ and 
includes the real estate and mortgage markets as well as the stock market (ibid). In this 
framework then, the role of banks is clearly not limited to the control of credit. Schumpeter, in 
fact, asserts that: 
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“The most cursory glance at money market processes shows that the banks regulate both 
stock market speculation and the pulse-beat of industrial and commercial life, now 
restraining, now stimulating them.” (Schumpeter 1956 [1917/1918]: 176) 
 
This implies that banks exert a very strong influence on economic life26. This power derives 
from two factors.  
First, Schumpeter assumes that both spheres of the money market are interrelated. 
Therefore, the markets for short-term loans and long-term assets do not work separately but 
interact within a single money market in which purchasing power is exchanged. This derives 
from Schumpeter’s conception of interest according to which “interest is a [monetary] value 
phenomenon and an element in price” (Schumpeter 1934: 173) flowing from profit (ibid: 
175). Given this definition, there is no rationale for distinguishing “between interest on loans 
and ‘original interest on capital” (ibid: 177). In Business Cycles, Schumpeter explains that 
“the capitalist process develops, along the money market, (…), perfect negotiability of all 
instrument of credit, whatever their legal form may be” (Schumpeter 1939/II: 613). In this 
perspective, there are no differences in principle between bonds and credit and between short 
term and long term interest rates. As Schumpeter indicates: 
 
                                                 
26 In a passage of his History of Economis Analysis, Schumpeter reasserts this point: 
 
“‘Credit operations’ of whatever shape or kind do affect the working of the monetary system; more 
important, they do affect the working of the capitalist engine – so much as to become an essential part of 
it without which the rest cannot be understood at all” (Schumpeter 1954: 318). 
From this perspective, Schumpeter can be viewed as a ‘creditist’ (Earley, 1994) since he considers that the 
behaviour of credit, i.e., the volume of borrowing and lending, is the fundamental financial variable in the 
determination of the general level of economic activity. In this sense, a creditist is opposed to a ‘monetarist’, 
who considers the stock of money, i.e., the means of payment, as the fundamental financial variable, while credit 
and its influence are of second importance. 
 
 25
“Bonds, for instance, thus become a vehicle of the shifting of balances, which only 
technically and by degree differs from short-term instruments (…).there exists no 
such thing as the long-term rate and that, if we nevertheless wish to use the 
concept, the thing we ought to mean is some kind of ‘trend value’ of short rates.” 
Schumpeter 1939/ II: 614) 
 
In other terms, the sphere of capital is hierarchically submitted to the sphere of hoards and 
reserves. 
Second, the ‘sphere of hoards and reserves’ depends heavily on banks since the latter can 
manipulate the volume of available liquidity through the lending of credit. By creating means 
of payment through organising credit, banks effectively regulate the activity of this sphere. 
Moreover, the interdependence of both spheres within the money market allows banks to 
extend their influence to the sphere of income-yielding assets. On the one hand, banks create 
ex nihilo credit means of payment, thereby strongly contributing to the emergence of interest. 
This, in turn, affects the whole economy in that the existence of interest now constitutes an 
additional motive to save on the part of consumers. In other terms, interest emerges through 
the activity of banks, through lending and borrowing and diffuses within the whole money 
market: 
 
“Lending and borrowing can become part of the normal routine of industry and 
commerce, and interest can economically and socially acquire the importance that 
it actually has, only if the control of present purchasing power means more future 
purchasing power to the borrower.” (Schumpeter 1935: 189) 
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Therefore, banks neither are, thus, purely neutral intermediaries nor are the effects of credit 
creation transitory since they give rise to a secondary wave of the creation of new sources of 
purchasing power which can be mobilised to finance further productive activity. However, the 
influence of bankers cannot be conceived as an irreversible process. As bankers are closely 
linked to the leadership of the entrepreneurs, which Schumpeter considers as transitory27 
(Schumpeter 1934: 90), their influence is necessarily subject to gradual or even radical 
change.   
 
To sum up, Schumpeter views the bankers as the ephors28 of the capitalist economy which 
control and select what can be financed and what is actually financed only is within the 
realms of possibility. In Schumpeter’s framework, this strategic function of finance is the 
prerogative of banking institutions and it is therefore not surprising that Schumpeter put so 
much emphasis on the role of banks or of the banker in business or economic activity. 
However, little attention was paid to a second fundamental aspect of Schumpeter’s 




2.2. The banker as an entrepreneur and innovator 
 
                                                 
27 There are at least two arguments mentioned by Schumpeter to account for the transitory nature of the 
leadership of entrepreneurs. A first one refers to the character traits of entrepreneurs. Schumpeter indeed notes 
that entrepreneurs do not have any “attitude or cultural tradition” (Schumpeter 1934: 90) and do not have the 
“prestige” of middle age warlike lords. A second reason lies in the fact that the position of the entrepreneurs 
might be threatened as soon as the necessary social function they have to achieve, i.e.,  introducing innovation 
for its most part, looses momentum. In this respect, it seems that innovation is inevitably associated to some 
resistance to change from the social environment in which the entrepreneur attempts to promote some change so 
that innovation is de facto transitory.   
28 An ephor was an elected magistrate of Sparta who exercised supervisory power over the kings. The term refers 
to an overseer, guardian or ruler.  
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The leading role of entrepreneurs in implementing productive or organizational 
innovations is one of the most widespread features of Schumpeter’s contribution. In this 
perspective, entrepreneurial business is implicitly considered as playing the lead in the 
financial negotiations that they carry on with financial institutions such as banks.  
In a capitalist environment however, bankers perform an entrepreneurial function, which is 
by no means less important than the one of business entrepreneurs for economic development. 
Clearly financial institutions and practices appear and disappear. Thus, Schumpeterian 
creation and destruction occur also in the field of finance, as well as innovation, whether it 
takes the form of product, process or organizational innovation or whether it consists in 
incremental or radical change. Moreover, new types of financing media may emerge and 
thereby, trigger further process and product innovation. Though not often stressed by 
commentators, this feature of bankers was emphasized by Schumpeter. He indeed noted that  
 
“Financial institutions and practices enter our circle of problems in three ways: they are 
“auxiliary and conditioning”; banking may be the object of entrepreneurial activity, that 
is to say, the introduction of new banking practices may constitute enterprise; and 
bankers (or other “financiers”) may use the means at their command in order to embark 
upon commercial and industrial enterprise themselves (for example John Law)” 
(Schumpeter 1947 [1989]: 153). 
 
This quotation shows that Schumpeter perfectly understood that financial institutions are 
also entrepreneurial organizations striving to innovate in order to generate capital gains. This 
implies that financial systems evolve not only in response to demands of business leaders and 
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individual investors but also as a result of the innovative activity of profit-seeking 
entrepreneurial financial firms.  
To put it in a nutshell, in Schumpeter’s theory of economic development, new 
combinations, which are the outcome of negotiations among entrepreneurial businessmen and 
financiers, lead to process and product innovations but also to new financing relations and 
financial institutions29.    
 
When Schumpeter was writing his Theory of Economic Development, i.e., in the early 
years of the twentieth century, the institutional background of capitalism was undergoing a 
process of ongoing change, inducing profit-seeking bankers to accommodate their practices to 
these successive changes. Each new stage of development reached during this period was 
backed up by specific financial tools as well as appropriate financial institutions. 
The two main functions of the Schumpeterian banker – as an ‘ephor’ and as an ‘innovator’ 
– examined above, perfectly reflect the specific industrial and financial environment of this 
historical period of capitalism. 
First, it may be useful to recall what is not the Schumpeterian banker: he or she is not the 
banker of “commercial capitalism”30. 
Commercial or ‘merchant’ capitalism springs from European feudal society and has its 
source in America with the establishment of British colonies in the 1660s. At that time, only 
trade was financed thanks to the banking system and emerging financial markets. Commercial 
capitalism is an outgrowth of merchants placing their goods on ships and caravans. Trade at a 
distance, and therefore payments at distance, requires expertise on behalf of bankers in long 
                                                 
29 See also Minsky (1990, 1993). 
30 We use the terminology of Whalen (2001) who identifies five stages of capitalism for US economic history: 
merchant capitalism (1607-1813), industrial capitalism (1813-1890), banker capitalism (1890-1933), managerial 
capitalism (1933-1982), and money-manager capitalism (1982-present). 
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distance merchant practices and in the techniques of international commercial finance. 
Banking practices of commercial capitalism, i.e., merchant banking, involves both the 
vouching for the legitimacy of distant trade partners and the financing of goods in transit. The 
financing of expensive and long-lived capital assets falls outside the domain of banks and 
organized financial markets. Proprietorships, partnerships, and governments provide the funds 
for the capital assets of such an economy (Minsky, 1993).  
The Schumpeterian great waves of innovation, which marked the railroad industry for 
instance, ended the period of commercial capitalism because the positions to be financed were 
too great to be handled in the usual way. Innovation in finance was a prerequisite – for the 
banking structures of merchant capitalism were ill-suited to finance the capital development 
of the economy.  
Obviously, Schumpeter’s view of the banker as the “ephor” of the capitalist system – 
providing finance for innovative, new combinations of resources – does not spring from 
‘commercial capitalism’ but from another specific stage of capitalist development, namely, 
‘industrial capitalism’ that lasted from 1813 to 1890. Industrial capitalism was characterized 
by the emergence of financial organizations that could mobilize the resources required for 
factory manufacturing, capital-intensive transportation, mills and mines, etc.  
In Great Britain and the United States, commercial banks were not the main channel used 
by corporations for financing their expensive investments that made the industrial revolution 
possible31. While trade was still financed through commercial credit, capital accumulation of 
these economies mainly depended upon financial markets. The main middlemen of these 
financing markets were investment bankers. This was the era of the houses of Rothschild and 
Morgan. These bankers acted as brokers when facilitating trade in existing issues and as 
dealers when underwriting new issues. These new lines of business sprang from the need to 
                                                 
31 The banks of this period often combined investment and commercial functions. 
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trade positions in the liabilities of business organisations and to provide external finance for 
capital asset ownership: 
 
“Stock exchange speculation, especially, and the speculative holding of newly issued 
stock were in all countries largely financed by banks, which, therefore, always served 
the purpose of financing long-time investments, at least in this indirect way, even if in 
no other” (J.A. Schumpeter 1939/I: 348). 
 
Those investment bankers, who proved to have been able to provide finance for innovative 
combinations of resources, then became the mainstay of economic power, the “ephor” of the 
“exchange” economy.  
But industrial capitalism was also a period marked by numerous rounds of cutthroat price 
competition. By threatening the financial health of industrial firms, this competition 
jeopardized the ability of corporations to fulfil their payment commitments. 
Responsible bankers, concerned about the quality of the instruments they sold, “began to 
abhor competitive markets” (Minsky 1993: 109). Morgan, for example is reported as having 
said, “I like a little competition; but I like combination better” (quoted by Heilbroner and 
Singer 1994: 206).  
By responding and accommodating to cutthroat competition, investment bankers paved the 
way for the development of ‘banker capitalism’ that spread through the United States in the 
1880s and 1890s. It is also during this period that the second feature of the Schumpeterian 
banker, i.e., its entrepreneurial and innovative function, is the most obvious. 
In the United States, the emergence of banker capitalism was characterized by investment 
bankers seeking to protect the cash flows of the firms they financed, which lead them to turn 
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their attention towards the financing of industrial combinations (cartels, trusts, and mergers), a 
trend not at all impeded by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Quite the contrary, a merger wave 
took place right in its aftermath. For instance, between 1892 and 1902, JP Morgan was 
instrumental in promoting mergers that created General Electric, American Telephone and 
Telegraph, International Harvester, and United States Steel (Heilbroner and Singer 
1994: 206): “By 1904, one or two giant firms – usually put together by merger – controlled at 
least half the output in seventy-eight different countries” (Heilbroner and Singer 1994: 208). 
At the industry level, investment bankers acquired a controlling position in the economy not 
only by promoting mergers but also by securing large ownership shares on the boards of 
directors of newly combined corporations. 
Such a phenomenon had already been observed in Germany several years before and 
noticed by Schumpeter (1939, Chapter VII) who praised German industrial credit banks 
(Kreditbanken) for their entrepreneurial attitude and for having, thereby, fostered the rise of 
large industries. 
In Germany, during the initial stage of industrialization (1850-1870), few large private 
banks were financing most of the newly established industrial firms. These banks did not 
develop as a consequence of industrialization, but pre-existed to it. They were enjoying 
considerable market power in an oligopolistic banking market that was protected by 
regulatory barriers to entry. They actively promoted investment in industrial technology and 
engaged in coordination of industrial investments. And these banks acted not only as lenders 
but also as shareholders, thus pioneering universal banking. Kreditbanken, played an active 
role in industrial development combining commercial and investment banking activities and 
nurturing close relations with industry (Da Rin, 1996). Between 1851 and 1870, 259 firms 
were incorporated, up from 102 in the previous 25 years. Incorporation was typically 
managed with the help of an industrial credit bank. Kreditbanken acted as universal banks, 
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providing loans and securities issue for their clients but also retaining equity positions in those 
firms32.  
The personal nature of their business relationships allowed them to gather and circulate 
information effectively and, thereby, to have a strong influence on investment decisions. As 
Tilly (1966: 181) argued: “the contribution of German bankers to the mobilization of capital 
operated not only on the supply side but on the demand side as well; by organizing and 
allying themselves so closely with industrial enterprises, banks strengthened and in part 
represented the demand for investment funds”33. 
It is very likely that Schumpeter’s vision of the banker as an innovator has been inspired by 
the American and German periods of “banker capitalism”. These periods indeed perfectly 
reflect Schumpeter’s idea, already underlined above, that “banking may be the object of 
entrepreneurial activity” not only because “the introduction of new banking practices may 
constitute enterprise” but also because “bankers may use the means at their command in order 
to embark upon commercial and industrial enterprise themselves” (Schumpeter 1989 [1947]: 
153). 
This vision should be however contrasted with the one of Hilferding (1910), who took part, 
together with Schumpeter, in Böhm-Bawerk’s seminars in Vienna. Hilferding endorsed a 
vision of finance, using the term, capital finance, which encompasses both banking and 
industrial capital. He therefore developed an analysis that undermined the tension existing 
                                                 
32 Riesser (1911: 339–40) described in detail the participations taken by Kreditbanken in railways and heavy 
industries in the 1850s. 
33 The great crash of 1929-33 marked the end of the era in which investment bankers dominated financial 
markets. In the US, the role of bankers as the ephors of the decentralized market economy was reduced when 
government took over the responsibility for the adequacy of profits, of aggregate demand. The flow of profits 
that followed from the deficits of government meant that the internal cash flows of firms could finance their 
investments. Management of established firms which had some market power that protected them from 
competition could be independent of their investment bankers: there was no need to use market intermediaries to 
finance investment. Firms rather that bankers were the masters of the private economy (For a more complete 
analysis, see Whalen, 2001, and Minsky,1993). 
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between industrial and finance capital, maintaining that they are doomed to melt into one 
single block. According to Hilferding, banks are more powerful in the relationship between 
finance and industry because first, money capital stands at distance from the production 
sphere and hence it achieves some kind of relative autonomy; second, since banks are able to 
diversify their assets, the failure of one transaction will not cause their bankruptcy, whereas 
the industrialists’ survival can be threatened by the failure of one single transaction. 
Therefore, Hilferding concluded that there is a univocal tendency for banking capital to 
dominate industry. This analysis has been criticized on several grounds (cf. Harris, 1988). In 
particular, Sweezy (1942) argues that industrial capital dominance was the main force in the 
expansion of capitalism. Industrial capital has acquired its own independence from banking 
capital by higher rates of internal accumulation. This has allowed industrial capital to reinvest 
profits in its industries without the need for further ending by the banks. According to 
Sweezy, Hilferding missed out a very important phase in the development of monopoly 
capitalism. Although the banks have the power to influence the formation of corporations and 
mergers, they cannot do so infinitely. In all likelihood, a middle position can be established 
using the insights of those two extremes. First, the power relationship between industrial and 
banking capital requires some kind of balance in order for the accumulation process to 
proceed. If banking capital has absolute power in this relationship, then it will accrue the 
whole of the surplus and the accumulation process will stop. On the other hand, if industrial 
capital plays the lead in appropriating the surplus, the owners of capital will be no longer be 
willing to lend out money capital.  From this perspective, financial innovations can be seen as 
many tools of adaptations to the tension existing between industrial and banking capital. 
Moreover, this tension is not constant but it is likely to change during the course of the cycle 
and the course of change in the capitalist economy so that is should not be analysed in a static 
context.  
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Streissler also provides an interesting historical perspective regarding those issues, noting 
that in the last two decades before World War One, Austrian bankers did not in fact finance 
the starting of new enterprises but rather gave old enterprises a new start through the 
incorporation of existing enterprises and the introduction, in progressive stages, of the 
common stock thus created on the stock exchange (Streissler 1983:  75). This interpretation 
gives strong support to the idea that bankers were innovators, not in the field of production 
but rather in the field of organization. By reorganizing the existing industries and by standing 
on the demand side of credit, bankers have played an important role in the upsurge of 
economic growth, but it was mainly due to economies of scale of incorporation and the easier 
access to credit which it made possible (ibid: 75). Moreover, large banks were mainly 
financing circulating capital and not investment in new capital goods. But the enormous 
increase in normal short term credit and mortgage credit opened new opportunities for 
financing part of the necessary building for other financial intermediaries: “increased finance 
of a completely traditional type, finance of the non-innovative side of the enterprise, may 
have set free capital for the innovative investment proper (…) [b]ut it was no conscious effort 
on behalf of the banks to further innovation” (ibid: 77). This situation was reinforced by the 
context of the depressive 1880s, characterized by both dwindling opportunities of government 
finance and a glutted credit market with declining rates of interest. Though mainly exerting a 
rather conservative influence, as shown by their reluctance towards competition and their 
tendency to impede it through the formation of cartels and their policy of caution, large 
Austrian banks were in the urgent need to find new investment outlets.  
 
 What emerges in Schumpeter’s analysis of the role of monetary, banking and financial 
institutions is the strong emphasis he puts on the process of transformation that those 
institutions are undergoing. This interpretation is confirmed by Schumpeter’s stance on the 
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problem of emergence of institutions. In particular, in an article dedicated to the fiscal State 
he wrote in 1918, Schumpeter indicates that: 
 
“Above all, there is the possibility, provided by the events described by fiscal theory, of 
perceiving the laws of social being and becoming and the forces which constrain the 
destinies of people and also the way according to which concrete situations, especially 
specific forms of organizations, can emerge and disappear” (J.A. Schumpeter 1918, n. 6, 
in Swedberg 1991: 133). 
 
It is also perfectly in line with what Schumpeter refers as “patrimonialization” of 
innovation and business practices. What Schumpeter means by “patrimonialization” is the 
process by which some social activities or some social classes tend to disappear because they 
do not correspond anymore to necessary social functions as they did before (Schumpeter 1951 
[1927]: 191-199). One of the key features of this process relates to individual economic 
behaviour, since Schumpeter emphasizes that the process of patrimonialization goes hand in 
hand with a process of growing rationalization. This characteristics is well illustrated by 
Schumpeter’s discussion on the role of routines. If he often opposes routines to innovation 
within the productive sphere, he also makes clear that routines are part of the underlying 
institutional setting. From this perspective, economic change is also concerned with how 
routines change. This is why, according to Schumpeter, some social functions such as the 
entrepreneurial function associated with leadership and innovative behaviour are likely to 
smooth down or even to disappear, as innovation diffuses within society. The process of  
“routinization of innovation” that Schumpeter refers to when referring to “Trustified 
Capitalism” in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, clearly illustrates this point: 
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“This social function is already losing importance and is bound to lose 
it at an accelerating rate in the future even if the economic process 
itself of which entrepreneurship was the prime mover went on 
unabated. For (…) it is much easier now than it has been in the past to 
do things that lie outside familiar routine – innovation itself being 
reduced to routine.” (Schumpeter 1950b: 132)  
    
This quotation stresses the fact that routines are embedded within society as a whole and 
illustrates how institutional change is important in order to deal with economic change.   
 
To conclude, our revisiting of Schumpeter gives strong support to an institutionalist 
interpretation of his work. Moreover, it permits, according to us, to revive the modern theory 
of institutions by providing a basis for dealing with institutional change or the dynamics of 




In this paper, we have shown that Schumpeter’s vision of the process of economic 
development and its associated financing problems is far more complex than it is usually 
assumed in the literature. We have stressed, in particular, the primary role of institutional 
change within the process of economic development. This feature is particularly relevant for 
analyzing the relation between the entrepreneur and the banker. We have indeed emphasized 
that this diptych is submitted to a process of co-evolution through an adaptive process of the 
financing structures of both the banking system and the firm. In this process, some new 
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institutional arrangements emerge as historical examples of incorporation and cartelization 
illustrate as well as new financial institutions such as investment banks for instance.  
From a more theoretical point of view, we have stressed, how the emergence of savings 
and of interest in the steady-state case, induces some institutional change within the financial 
system of the economy, as the development of the two spheres – the sphere of hoards and 
reserves and the sphere of capital –  that constitute the money market exemplifies.  
What results from our analysis is that Schumpeter’s analysis of economic change cannot be 
dealt with separately from both his conception of institutional change and his methodological 
approach. This feature does not preclude an evolutionary interpretation of Schumpeter’s 
works but, if we want to use the term ‘evolutionary’, we have to stress the specificity of 
Schumpeter’s conception of economic evolution, which involves institutional change as a 
logical priority. Moreover, since, according to Schumpeter, institutional change occurs both at 
the individual and collective levels, a ‘mechanical’ process of selection is irrelevant for 
explaining both institutional and economic change. We exemplified this Schumpeterian 
analytical perspective, showing that, even if the entrepreneur and the banker are crucial for 
the existence of economic development, their emergence is however rooted in some 
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Abstract 
This paper offers an institutionalist interpretation of Schumpeter’s contribution to economics 
based on an overall investigation of his works, from his early writings devoted to economic 
sociology to his late Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, through his theory of economic 
development. This interpretation is then examined closely by revisiting the role of monetary, 
banking and financial institutions during the different phases of economic development. We 
conclude by maintaining that Schumpeter’s overall framework is suitable and still very 
relevant for analysing institutional change.  
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